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ABSTRACT
An Intelligent Control System for reusable rocket engines is under development at NASA Lewis Research Center.
The prim,u-y objective is to extend the useful life of a reusable rocket propulsion system while minimizing between flight
maintenance and maximizing engine life and performance through improved control and monitoring algorithms and
additional sensing and actuation. Tiffs paper describes current progress towards proof-of-concept of an Intelligent Control
System for the Space Shuttle Main Engtne. A subset of identifiable and accommodatable engine failure modes is selected
for preliminary demonstration. Failure models are developed retaining only first order effects and included in a simplified
nonlinear simulation of the rocket engine for analysis under closed loop control. The engine level coordinator acts as an
interface'between the diagnostic and control systems, and translates thrust and mixture ratio commands dictated by mission
requirements, and engine status (health) into engine operational strategies carried out by a muhlvadable control. Control
reeonfiguration achieves fanh tolerance if the nominal (heahhy engine) control cannot. Each of the aforementioned
functionalities is discussed in the context of an example to illustrate the operation of the system in the context of a
representative failure. A graphical user interface allows the researcher to monitor the Intelligent Control System and engine
performance under various failure modes selected for demonstration.
Reusable rocket engines present a
very challenging operational environment
and requires high performance, low
maintenance, and man-rated reliability
levels. Multiple start-stop cycles cause
thermal gradients with high thermM strains
per cycle within the engine. High steady
state operating stresses create large I
inelastic strains. High dynamic loads
induce high cycle stresses. In the Space
Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), an
operatio,ml version of a reusable rocket
engine, high performance and reliable I
operation have been achieved. However, Loriginally predicted levels of usable filethave not been demonstrated and extensive
between flight maintenance has resulted.
Merrill and Lorenzo have
proposed a framework outlining specific
functionalhies to hnprove the durability
of the SSME which include active control
of key engine parameters, real time
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diagnostics, and life extending coqtrol2.
A fimctiona[ framework showiqg the various capabilities' included in the Intelligent Control System (ICS) is given in
Figure 1. The principal components inch=de a distributed diagnostic system, an intelligent coordinator, a,ld a
reconfigurable controller. The distributed diagnostic system is composed of sensor validation, a model based failure
detector, a role based failure detector, ReREDS (reusable rocket engine diagnostic system) and a diagnostic expert system.
ReREDS is a condition monitoring/diagnostic software system developed during the past two years through a coqtract with
System Coatrot Technology (SCT) and Aerojet. The engine level coordinator in Figure I makes alterations to the controller
usi,tg engine status i,fformation generated by the diagnostic system, and propulsion requirements passed down by the
propulsion level coordinator as shown. Each SSME is part of the propulsion system for the orbiter vehicle and is
orchestrated by the propulsion level coordiqator which receives thrust vector commands from the flight cuntrolle," to
achieve mission success. Ultimately. the engine level coordinator must satisfy minimum thrt, st requirements while
minimizing further component degradation and acco,nmodating failed or degraded engine hardware. The reconfigurable
co,ltroller takes reqt,ests generated by the coordinator, makes the changes gradt!ally thereby minimizing etlgine transients,
and computes the valve positio=m to achieve the requested behavior from the engine.
Thispaperdescribesanongoing research program at tile NASA Lewis Research Center to demonstrate an ICS for a
reusable space propulsion system (SSME) A significant milestone for the ICS program is tile successful integration of real
..... --- . . , ....
tnne dmgnostJcs ',wth a reconftgurable control3 providing motivation for demonstration wnth a subset of accommodatable
failure modes. The focus of this work is on failure mode modelling, controls and coordination, and the graphical user
intcrface. Detailed discussion of the distributed diagnostic system appears elsewhere4. An accommodation strategy for a
particular failure mode is discussed in detail and simulation results are presented to clarify the various functionalities and
potential benefits of the Intelligent Control System.
FAILURE MODES
Modelling failure modes for the ICS project presents a difficult challenge due to several competing objectives.
On the one hand there is the desire to accurately describe the progress and effects of a given failure as it occurs. Typically.
this requires models not only for the relevant fluid dynamics but for the structural dynamics as well. Such models are
necessarily computatlonally intensive and time consuming to develop. On tile other hand, there is the desire to maintain
simple models such that real time simulation may be achieved with. existing computer hardware. The real time requirement
is necessitated by the fact that the diagnostic system and controller under development will eventually be placed on an
actual engine, and must therefore respond within the appropriate time scale. Simple failure models also require much less
time to develop and are readily available for use in detection and accommodation studies for development of an expert
system rule base.
At this point in time, the focus of the project is proof of concept. Therefore, a philosophy of maximum simplicity
has been adopted for the task of modelling rocket engine failures. By this we mean that the consequences of a given failure
are sought without regard to the cause or the relative time that the failure takes to develop. The following discussion details
models for several failure modes selected for demonstration of an ICS. Motivation for their selection will be presented,
along with a description of their implementation in the real time simulation model of the SSMEJ. In addition, open loop
transients of key engine parameters are provided to illustrate the qualitative behavior of the models.
FAILURE MODE SELECTION
The following five failure modes have been selected for the preliminary ICS demonstration: a failure of a control
sensor (Pc). a frozen Fuel Preburner Oxidizer Valve (FPOV). a Low Pressure Fuel Turbo Pump (LPFTP) shaft seal system
failure, a High Pressure Fuel Turbo Pump (HPFFP) turbine tip seal failure, and a High Pressure Oxidizer Turbo Pump
(FIPOTP) shaft seal system failure. One of the primary goals of the project is to examine a variety of techniques for failure
detection and accommodation since no one is expected to perform well for all types of failures. The modes listed above
cover a broad class of possible problems for the engine with the exception of bearing failures. Unfortunately. the real time
engine simulation used for this work does not readily lend itself to including failure modes involving vibration, or other
structural phenomena.
Sensor failures and actuator faih, res are among the most straight forward to implement and require no modelling.
Consequently. they have been omitted from the following discussion. The HPOTP shaft seal failure has been covered
extensively elsewhere6 and will not be repeated here.
FAILURE MODE MODELLING
LPFTP Shaft Seal System Failure. Tile LPFTP shaft seal system prevents the relatively hot hydrogen gas which
drives the low pressure turbine from mixing with the liquid hydrogen being driven through the low pressure pump. The
seal system consists of two seals. One is a labyrinth seal located at the base of the second stage turbine blade. The other is a
simple ring seal on the shaft itself. Since both of these are clearance type seals, a small amount of leakage occurs even during
normal operatio,L This value is approximately .49 lbm/sec. Using the perfect gas assumption the flow tiarougil the
labyrinth seal may be written as
fi'tl,b = 71CD d ClabPlpftl _t/ g¢ f(PR) (1)
V RTlp|ti
where Co is the discharge coefficient, d is the turbine disk diameter. Chd, is the seal clearance, g,: is the gravitational constant,
R is the real gas constant, T and P are the LPPTP turbine inlet temperature and pressure respectively, and PR is the pressure
ratio across the seal, i.e. Pexlt/Pil,ftl. In this equation f(PR) has the form
f(PR) _'_/ !-PR 'z . (2)
_( 5 - In(PR)
Assuming adiabatic flow and choked conditions, ihe flow throngh the ring seal may be written as
rh,i., = 0.685 rr Ct_d c,,,,,Pc,;, '_R gT_l'_,ti (3)
where d. and Crlnktnow correspond to the shaft diameter and the ring seal clearance respectively. The multiplicative constant
.685 is obtained using a specific heat ratio for hydrogen gas of 1.4. Assuming a common discharge coefficient of 0.9 for
both seals and disk and shaft diameters of 6.0 and 2,0 inches respectively, equations I and 3 may be equated and the
common terms eliminated to obtain
c,-i._ = 4.381 f(PR) (4)
Cl,b PR
This equality cannot be rearranged to obtain an analytical expression for the pressure ratio PR as a function of clearance due
to the nature of f(PR). However, an approximation can be obtained by expanding equation 4 in a Taylor series about
PR = 1. The result is
1 + _tl + .75 [5(PR)
PR = 2.0 (5)
[3(PR)
where CR=crinLi/ClRb and 8(CR) is
13(CR) = 1.303 CR 2 + 7.0. (6)
Thus with the clearance of each seal known, and the LPFTP turbine inlet state known, equation 5 may be used to obtain PR.
With PR knowu, Pexlt is known, and equation 3 may be used to obtain the flow rate through tim seal.
The clearance of the ring seal must be specified and a failure of the system is initiated by using a clearance which is
much larger (approximately a factor of ten for the demonstration) than the nominal value which is assumed to be 3 mils.
The clearance of the labyrinth seal depends upon the speed of" the turbine. Specifically, the governing equation may be
written as
where to is the turbine shaft speed in tad/see. The
constants at and a2 where chosen such that the
clearance is 5 mils at 100 percent power and 0 mils
at fldl power.
The LPFTP shaft seal model has been
implemented on the real time SSME simulation by
introducing these equations into the code. The
mass flow rate through the seal system was
suhtracted from the low pressure fuel turbirte
discharge mass flow and added to the pump
discharge mass flow. The pump discharge
temperature was modified to account for the hot gas
mixing with the cold liquid. Figures 2a, 2b. and 2c
show the open loop response of the shaft seal failure
at rated power. Chatuber pressure was insensitive to
the shaft seal failure, and has been omitted. The seal
degradation is shown on all plots to occur at four
seconds and take place over a two second interval at
a consta,_t ramp rate. For the failure shown, the
leakage rate from the turbine to the pump increased
from a nominal 0.486 ibm/sec to 1.66 Ibm/see
causing a decrease in the LPFTP pump discharge
pressure shown in Figure 2a as the turbine pumps
less fuel from the tank. Figure 2b shows how the
increase in hot gas entering the cool fuel from the
supply tank results in a slight increase in pump
discharge temperature. Both the discharge pressure
and temperature along with the volumetric fuel
flow from the pump and chamber pressure are used
to estimate the mixture ratio in the main
combustion chamber. Figure 2c shows how the
relatively minor leakage causes the mixture ratio
estimate to degrade. The degradation is caused by
the relatively large drop in the pump discharge
pressure. The poor mixture ratio causes some
difficulties for the multivariable control approach
and is discussed in some detail later. The LPF'FP
shaft seal failure model provides the qualitative
behavior of interest for closed loop analysis and
development of accommodatiott strategies.
HPFTP Turbine Ti0 Seal Failure. Turbine
tip seals are desig,ted to prevent leakage of gas
between the outside eqds of the turbine blades and
ci,t, = 0.005 -al ( to2 - a2 ) (7)
284
r,. 276 ..... i
Shaft Se __D__egra_E 268 .....................................
-",1
q3
_.__o 260 ..................... ___ i.........................
_' 252 -:...........................................................
t-
O
N 244
la.
228 ................. _'"
0 5 10 15
Time (sec)
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Figure 21) Open Loop Response of LPFTP Discharge Temperature to
LPFT Shaft Seal Degradation
the turbine casing. The rate of leakage which
occurs in this region is generally very small
compared to tile total flow through tile turbine; 6.5-
however, tile effect oq performance can be
significant. The fluid leaking arou,_d tile tip of tile
turbine blade disturbs the flow field on tile rest of
tile aerofoil in a manner simil,'u" to crossflow over an 6 -
airplane wing. This results in reduced lifting
capacity of the blade and therefore reduced o
efficiency of the turbine. In order to prevent this _ 5.5
effect, turbine blades are often shrouded on tile "
ct}
ends. The shroud reduces the crossflow and
subsequent sensitivity to tip leakage. Furthermore, _ 5
the shroud is t)plcally equipped with a labyri,tth
type tip sea! which cuts down significantly on the
leakage flow. The HPFTP does not have shrouded 4.5
blades however, due to high speed and inlet
temperature. Sealing is therefore affected by
maiqtaining as small a clearance as possible 4
between tile blade tip and tile housing. A seal
failure represems a change in this clearance to some
value significaqtly larger than the design value.
Experiments demonstrate7 that the relationship
between turbine efficiency and tip clearance is
generally linear; however, the slope is strongly
dependent on the number and degree of reaction of
the turbine stages. Although it has beeq
determined to be a relatively likely failureS, no
actual mention of the cause of the tip seal clearance
change has been made or the degree of clearance
change flint is expected. Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c 3060
demonstrate the qualitative behavior of this failure
in an open loop simulation of the real time SSME
model for a 10% ramp decrease iq turbine
efficiency beginning at four seconds. Figure 3a -_" 2639
shows a relatively slight decrease in chamber
pressure resulting from the decrease in the HPFTP _ 2618
pump discharge pressure. The pump discharge
pressure drops because the turbine is doing less
work on the fluid for the given preburner Cl.
temperature. Figure 3b shows both the estimated _ 2396
and actual MRs rising because of the drop in fuel ,',
being pumped by tile HPFTP. Notice the slight E
degradation in the MR estimate as the failure _ 2175
propagates to its full vah,e at six seconds. This
degradation in tile estimatioq scheme does not
cause difficulties with the MVC as in the case
discussed above. Figure 3c shows a dramatic rise in 1954
the I IPFTP discharge ternperature resulting from
the decrease in the turbines ability to remove
energy from the hot gas of the preburner. The ope,!
loop responses shown in these figures typify
behavior for a decrease ill efficiency of tile high
presstrre fuel turbi,le and coincide with our
physical understanding of the failure and its impact
on performance parameters.
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CONTROLS AND COORDINATION
The control and coordination fnnctioqs lie at the heart of tile i'ntelligent control system. Selection of failure
modes for an on-line diagnostic system is driven by the ability to accommodate sucqrl fa_ures or degradations in hardware
using existiqg sensing and actuation. Additional sensing and actuation hardware may be considered by weighting expected
costs against benefits in conjunction with the likelihood of the failure occurring and the effect if left unattended. For this
work. an additional actuator was selected for inclusion in an engine modeTbased on recommendations from a study
performed by Rocketdy,le9 under co,dract to NASA LeRC. In addition, the i,lstrumentation set on the Marshall Space
Flight Center Technology Test Bed is assumed.
t_LQ.blI_NAL 2d LL_T_UEARLA_L E CONTROLLER
Control of the SSME is accomplished through five valves shown in Figure 4. In particular, the Main Oxidizer
Valve (MOV), Main Fuel Valve (MFV), Coolant Control Valve (CCV), Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer Valve (OPOV), and
f
||
2
Fuel Prel)urner Oxidizer Valve (FPOV) are open
loop scheduled to perform the siartup and shtttdown
operations. In Ihe actual SSNIE controller (Bh_k I), 7-
only FPOV and OPOV are used as closed loop
control valves for mainstage operation. To 6.5-
analytically explore the benefits of enllanced engine
controllability, the Oxidizer Preburner Fuel Vah, e
(OPFV) was added while the previous five valves o 6
were also considered for closed loop control during "_
mainstagel0, w
5,5
A number of measureme,*t Iocatio**s are
shown in Figure 4 which represent a subset of the 5
SSME test bed sensor suite. The discharge pressure
and temperature of the Low Pressure Fuel
Turbopump (Pfdl and Tfdl respectively)as well as 4.5
volumetric fuel flow (Qflm). and chamber pressure
(Pc) are used for estimating mixture ratio (MR) in the
existing SSME Block I controller. The discharge 4
pressure of the High Pressure Fuel Tutbopump (Pill2), 0
the discharge temperatures of the High Pressure Fuel
and Lox Turbines (Tft2d and Tot2d respectively).
the pressure of the Fixed Nozzle Heat Exchanger
(P4). the press,ire of the IVlain Chamber Heat
Exchanger (P:i), and the fuel supply pressure of the
preburners (P0) are used iq conjunction with P,. to 1850
form the sensor suite for the multivariable control.
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n'-
Multivariable control (MVC) methods 6_
generally rely on-linear state space models of the ._ 1760
process to be controlled. A perturbation model of a
simplified (39 state) nonlinear dynamic engine _-
model at rated power was used for coqtroi design10, o
The li,aear models of the SSME change very little r.-.
from the 65% to the 109% power (thrust) level. _ 1670
therefore gain-scheduling was not required. MVC t_
allows the integration of multiple objectives of Pc. ¢_
Mr. Tft2d, and Tot2d command f.ollowing for
example, while decoupling each of the control loops ,1"7 1580
from the others using all six valves in Figure 4 as o.
"r"
closed loop control valves.
The nominal controller is designed with
the objective of providing the highest degree of
fault tolerance and robustness possible for the
engine using all available valves and some subset of
available sensors while meeting specified
performance co,lstrainls. Ideally, the sensors selected
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for slate estimation in the slate feedback controller
would be the most reliable and most accurate of the available instrumentation. However, a performance versus robustuess
tradeoffs must be made if the most reliable sensors result in a non-miuimum phase reatizationl0.
A fault tolerant and robust control design for a rocket engine ,nay be achieved in two ways using muldvariable
control. The first involves designing the controller to be insensitive to variations in the engine, modelling errors, and
sensor noise. A variety of formalized techniques for accomplishing this are available in the controls literature based upon
the design methodology used. The second involves wisely selecting the variables for closed loop control. For example, a
"traditional" control design would allow set point control of both P,: and MR to provide variable throttling and near
constant combustion temperature in the main chamber over a range of power levels, respectively. However, for a staged
combustion cycle, controlling the discharge temperatures of the high pressure turbines provides a means of regulating the
combustio,_ temperatures in the fuel and Iox preburners. Moreover, discharge temperatures are redline quantities on the
SSME. Re,lithe cutoffs resulting from a decrease in fuel turbine efficiency, can be avoidedll. In general, closed loop
control of redline variables may widen the envelope of operation for the engine allowing greater flexibility for off design
operation. Cousequently. a fault tolerant multivariable control design can be achieved by including Tft2d and Tot2d in
the controlled variable list along with Pc and MR for the set point controller. However. there may be a better choice given
typical variations in engine builds and the difficulty of providing consistent and accurate measurements of turbine
discharge temperature. The final selection mus! depeud upon the practical aspects of implementing such a design on a Ilight
system.
RECONFIGURABLE
The notion of altering the structure of the controller to accommodate changes in the plant is very attractive for
faultolerance, Muclt work Ilas been done in the area of aircraft survivability in combat situations witit a focus on actuator
failures resulting from battle damager2. However, most approaches are heuristic in nature due to the difficulty in
generalizing results from a specific application and vary between aprlori and on-line design. A comnlon theme is to
distribute the control effort for a failed actuator over the remaining, hopefully somewhat redundant actuators in the system.
The SSME has six
valves while the nominal
engine cotltroller has only
four parameters as
controlled quantities.
Therefore, it would appear
that the engine has two
redundant valves for
independent control of Pc,
MR. Tft2d and Tot2d during
mai,lstage operation since
the input matrix of the
design model is not rank
deficietlt. However, the
nominal control designl0
does not use MOV or MFV
for mainstage operation
since these two valves are
primarily for startup and
shutdown. In fact, MOV and
MFV are kept wide open for
all power ranges
encountered during
mainstage operation in the
Block I controller.
Therefore, it was concluded
that these valves should not
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Figure 4 Modified Propellant Flow Schematic of the Space Shuttle Main Engine
be moved for nominal engine operation by increasing the control weighing in the muitivariable design. However, these
valves can play a major role in accommodating a failure in one or more of the primary control valves (FPOV, OPOV, CCV
and OPFV).
One approach for control reconfiguration for actuator failures is shown in Figure 5. The basic idea is to design a
controller for each of the failure conditions and then switch designs once the failure is identified by the online diagnostic
system. For example, if the position of FPOV sticks at a certain time in the mission, then a control law (uh,ov) designed
without the column corresponding to FPOV in the B matrix of the design plant is blended with the nominal control (tlnom)
to give the applied control (u,0p) as
u,l,t,(t) = (1-_.(0) Unont(t) + ,_(t) UflxJv(t), where _,(t) _ [0.11. (8)
As shown in the figure, the nominal and off-nominal control designs run in parallel to minimize startup transients associated
with switching between controllers. The approach is straight forward from both a conceptual and implementation
standpoint. The difficulty is selectitag an acceptable blel_ing rate X(t) between the nominal control al_ the new control For
the failure condition. Once the new controller is active, the closed loop performance and robustness are known from the
apriori design. However, the approach has several short comings. The most sign_cantbeing the high number of parallel
controllers of order (N) for a potentially large number of failure scenarios (M) resuhing i, a control system of order N*M
making i,nplementation of such a system in flight hardware somewhat impractical. Another potential problem involves
integrator windup for each of the controllers nmhing in parallel but _'off-line". Wi,ldup may result Ln transients of the kind
we hoped to avoid by running the controllers in parallel in the first place. However, this behavior has t_ot been a problem
to date and can be mhfimized further by ramping between controllers more slowly. The approach taken is not a panacea.
however it does allow us to explore the potential benefits of using control reconfiguration in a relatively straight forward
way.
.E2__VEL COORDINATOR
The engine level coordinator may change the setpoints of the currently controlled variables to meet performance
constraints, avoid detrimental operating conditions, change the controlled variables (i.e. mode switching), or select an
alternate control structure to accommodate a failed or degraded component i,1 the engine system as summarized by Figure 5.
/vloreover. degradations or failures of certain engine components may adversely affect performance limits. In this situation.
the coordinator most recompute new limits based on infor,nation provided by the on-line diagnostic system. The engine
level coordinator is responsible for meetit_g thrust a,ld MR requirements set by the propulsion level to the extent possible
while avoiding an engine shutdown cortdition. Engine shutdown is determined by the propulsion level coordination based
on information provided by the engine level coordinator, relative health of the remainder of the propulsion system, and
mission safety requirements. Information about the health of the engine and the necessary performance parameters are
supplied to the propulsion coordinator to aid decisio,l making at that level about each engine's thrust and MR.
A bottom up strategy has been adopted to develop algorithms for use in the engine level coordinator. For the
failure modes considered thus far. only the
FPOV sticking has resulted in any identifiable
coordination activity. If the valve sticks at
some point during tile Max Q maneuver, the
maximum achievable thrust for the engine will
decrease if the MR selpoint is observed. The
job of the coordinator is to determine the
maximum thrust as a function of the estimated
position of the stuck valve and provide this
new limit to the controller. The HPFTP turbine
tip seal failure could have coordinatioq
activity by changing the set points for Pc,
Tft2d, and Tot2d based on the estimated change
in turbine efficiency. However, the MVC
reaches a balance without any explicit cha,_ges
in commands9 thereby making tile problem one
of potential integrator windup. The LPFTP
shaft seal failure may require some
coordination, but this work must wait until an
alternative MR estimatio,_ scheme is developed
to provide a suitable value for the
multivariable control. The HPOTP seal system
failures have no direct affect on performance
parameters, however off nominal operation
such as slowing the pump down may help to
avoid furtl!er degradations. However, our
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modelling efforts have not progressed to tile Figure 5 Multivariable Reconfigurable Control Scheme
level of detail which would allow some reasonable assessment of the effect of speed on seal wear during failure propagation.
ACCOMMODATION STRATEGIES
Accommodation strategies have been developed for the sticking of FPOV and tile HPFTP turbine tip seal faihlre.
The simulation results for accommodation of the turbine tip seal failure have been published elsewherell and will not be
repeated itere. Further work is required for the LPFTP shaft seal and possibly tile HPOTP shaft seal system. The MVC is
tnarginally unstable for a nontrivial leakage in the LPFTP shaft seal when using the MR estimation algorithm developed for
the Block I control. The reason for this has roots in the differing design philosophies between Block I and tile MVC. The
MVC has MR as the "fast" control loop while the Block I control as Pc as the "fast" loop. Having MR as the faster loop
provides better control of temperature deviations in tile engine cycle and results in a lower order controller since the MR
response is much slower than Pc. Oscillations in the MR response result from the impact of tile LPFTP sitar seal failure on
the quality of the MR estimate as shown earlier in Figure 3a. while the Block ! control experiences no difficulty in
regulating Pc and MR. Work is in process to develop an alternative MR scheme using a kalman filter to alleviate the
marginal instability with tile MVC.
FPOV Sticking. The sticking of the
FPOV during the thrust bucket of the SSME
mission could result in extreme structural
loading on the orbiter vehicle with possible
loss of mission if an accommodation strategy
does not allow completion of the transient. To
accomplish the accommodation, an off-
nonfinal control ,nay be designed which makes
use of tile remaining valves
(OPOV,MOV,MFV,CCV, and OPFV) to provide
closed loop control of MR and Pc while
ignoring turbine discharge temperatures. Once
the on-line diagnostic system has diagnosed the
failure and estimated the position of the failed
valve, the coordinator can compute the
maximum possible Pc for the engine without
forcing IVlR off nominM (6.011). The
coordinator generates new commands for the
engine and initiates control btendi,lg using tim
approach outlined above. Once control
reconfiguration is complete, the off nominal
control provides variable throttling and MR
control throughout the remainder of the
mission with a new limit on maximum thrust
for that eqgine.
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The off-nominal controller without
the FPOV is synthesized using the same control Figure 6 Chamber Pressure Response for Thrust Bucket with Valve Failure
structure, design methodology and sensor suite
employed with the nominal controller. Coqtrol of
MR without using the FPOV is n very difficult ta,_k
since the MR response depends heavily on this valve.
In fact. the Block I control uses FPOV exclusively
for MR regulation. The design procedurel0 resulted
in a controller of the same order as tile nonfinal
control and uses four vah'es (OPOV, CCV, OPFV and
MFV) to decouple the MR from the P_.. response.
Theoretically, decoupling using fewer valves is
possible. However tile objective was to demonstrate
the capability of recovering from a failure in a
primary control valve while preserving control of Pc
and MR. "]'he off nominal control performs
satisfactorily over mainstage without gain
scheduling as does the nominal control.
Figures 6 and 7 show the Pc and MR
responses for the thrust bucket maneuver,
respectively. Figure 6 includes five curves with two
sets of two being identical until after approximately
the eleven second mark and are highlighted with a
rectangle. The coordinated and uncoordinated MVC
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Figure 7 Mixture Ratio Response for Thrust Bucket with Valve
Failure
and thrust command demonstrate the importance of the engine level coordination. The Block I controller response is
included for reference purposes to motivate the need for accommodation. Tile failure of FPOV occurs at exactly three
seconds into tile transient when the valve locks tip. The responses shown assume identification takes place instantly which is
certainly unrealistic. The plots show the best you can do with tile reconfigurable MVC. Any delay in identification will
degrade the performance of tile accommodation scheme. Very little perturbation is seen during accommodation of the valve
by the MVC while the Block ! control is smooth since OPOV is responsible for Pc control. Figure 7 shows tile degradation
in MR control when the valve sticks for both MVC and Block !. However. reconfiguration of the MVC by four seconds
(blending) begins to return MR to tile design point while the Block I response shows the coupling between Pc and MR.
thnlst while MR in Figure 7 increases
to 7% over nominal, if coordination
takes place, then the responses
labelled "Coordinated MVC" result.
Figure 6 shows how a decrease in
demanded thrust for the MVC can be
achieved while keeping MR in
Figure 7 at or about tile nominal
setting, A decrease in demanded
thrust by a particular engine in a
propulsion system can be
com,pensated for by other "healthy"
engines in the cluster without
compromising tile mission.
If the coordinator does not lower tile maximum Pc for tile engine based on tile position of FPOV then the responses
shown for the "Uncoordinated MVC" result. Figures 6 and 7 show the tradeoff between Pc and MR when "too much" thrust
is requested from tile engine. Neither Pc or IvlR can meet demand, therefore the MVC balances the errors based upon tile
relative weights used in the design procedure. The imbalance is exemplified by tile Block I control which meets requested
INTELLIG ENT CONTROLS
GRAPHICAL USER INTERFACE
The Graphical User
Interface (GUI) was developed to
allow the ICS to be monitored
during operation. The GU! permits
operators to observe tile ICS in real-
time operation as it accommodates
faults in components, sensors, and
actuators, using a collection of
screens designed to provide a clear
illustration-through plots, text, and
animation-of the entire process, The
GUI is a full-color, object-oriented
__.==-,_.._-_ " _11 --,_ i =._
SpReE ShUttLE nMln EWOtI,IE FLa_L vlEu
(yOu _maE _ELEC_ED rile FLLL VIEU e,CREEH) 1
a2 _eo 3_o 5i_ 1i,c
Old1,o.ooJt J t I ilit I itliilJ
1HN-1TiTI-I-HqlI l"
l-IIIH- I I"
i : tlLi H.[.i i i i i i i i i I r
IHIEIIi'_TIQI" +_'ll _llllLl z.0tt
Figure 8 Main Screen for the Intelligent Control System Graphical User Interface
system consisting of a set of screens arranged hierarchically. Each screen consists of three windows: a mouse-sensitive
graphical display window containing a diagram of a component or system, a plotting window depicting time responses of
key variables associated with that component or system, and an interactive type-out window displaying messages attd
allowing tile user to enter commands. When the mouse pointer is over a selectabie object in the mouse-sensitive graphical
display window, a box appears around the object and its nalne is displayed at tile bottotn of the screen. Clicking on it brings
8
upthescreencorrespondi,lgtotheobject.Thehierarchyofscreensmaybeviewedinthisma,mer.Figure8showsan
examplescreen.The top window contains a view of the space shuttle main engine composed of selectable objects, the
window on the lower left displays messages, and that on the lower right displays plots. One of the components is selected as
indicated by the box around it aml its name is displayed in the lower left corner of the figure. The GUI plots time responses
of important variables and indicates failures to the user through messages in the type-out window and by causing failed
mouse-selectable co,nponents to flash. The user may brin_ up more detailed screens by clicking: on the objects. Because of
the modular, object-oriented nature of the GUI, the creation of additional screens is simple a_ld quick. Thus appropriate
screens can be added easily as more failure modes are incorporated into the testbed system.
SUMMARY
Demonstration of an Intelligent Control System for reusable rocket engines (SSME) is on-going at NASA LeRC.
To facilitate this process, a preliminary subset of failure modes was selected from the set of all accommodatable failure
modes, tn particular, failure of a control sensor (Pc). a frozen Fuel Preburner Oxidizer Valve, a Low Pressure Fuel Turbo
Pump shaft seal failure, a High Pressure Fuel Turbo Pump turbine tip seal failure, and a High Pressure Oxidizer Turbo Pump
shaft seal failure were selected. Due to the requirement of accommodating engine failures or degradations, hot fire data
cannot be used in closed loop evaluation and serves to validate health monitoring algorithms only. Consequently. a
modelling effort is ongoing to study the effects of the failures on SSME performance and some results to date have been
included. Modelling has focused on first order effects a,_d little attention has been paid to the propagation of failures or the
potential negative impact of off nominal operation of the engine and subsequent failures. These are important issues,
however our focus is constrained given available resources to address this complex problem. The failure models are used to
study the behavior of the engine as a failure occurs during closed loop operation with a nominal engine controller. If
unacceptable behavior results, the operating point or the set of co,_trolled variables or both is changed to accommodate the
problem by the engine level coordinator. If none of these actions resolves the anomalous behavior, an alternate control
design is performed off-line to meet the requirement of fault tolerance. A reconfiguration scheme has been presented which
allows switching between predesigned controllers running in parallel based on the identified engine failure. An example
using a stuck Fuel Preburner Oxidizer Valve was given to illustrates these ideas on a realtime simulation of the SSME.
Results show that successful accommodation of primary control valves can be achieved using control reconfiguration in
conjtmctio,i with a multivariable design ,nethodology. Finally. the graphical user interface for the Intelligent Control
System project was prese,_ted which aides the analysis of the system during accommodation of simulated engine failures.
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